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Introduction 
The judicial enforcement of the socio-economic rights contained in
the South African Constitution (Constitution)  has not been without1
controversy when compared to the judicial enforcement of civil and
political rights. While socio-economic rights have been accorded
justiciability by their express incorporation in the Bill of Rights, the
courts are yet to enforce these rights in a manner that translates
them into individual goods and services. The Constitutional Court
approach to the enforcement of these rights has come into question
particularly as the Court has rejected the concept of minimum core
obligations and has failed to give the rights normative content.  The2
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rejected an out of court settlement as it would not solve the underlying
constitutional challenge and would not benefit similarly situated people. 
S 3 below. 7
Court has been admonished further for its failure to grant remedies
that translate the abstract rights on paper into tangible goods and
services for the majority of South Africans drowning in poverty.3
While the truth that socio-economic rights are justiciable rights is
beyond doubt, one cannot deny the fact that these rights, by their nature,
are not exactly the same as civil and political rights. The enforcement of
socio-economic rights, compared to that of civil and political rights, poses
far more challenges.  Indeed, it is evident from the current socio-economic4
rights jurisprudence that the Constitutional Court is grappling with a
number of these challenges. In trying to translate the abstract rights into
reality, the Court has also been at pains to preserve the boundaries that
exist between itself and the other organs of state in accordance with the
separation of powers doctrine.  Additionally, because poverty in South5
Africa is so widespread, the Court is struggling to find judicial remedies
that will realise the rights not just for the individual litigants before them,
but also for similarly situated persons.  This is in addition to addressing all6
interests implicit in the outcome of the case for persons who may not even
be similarly situated but are affected by the case. This is where the issue
of polycentricity comes into play,  as it is believed that socio-economic7
rights are more polycentric than other rights, which is why some scholars
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doubt their practical justiciability.  In contrast, civil and political rights are8
promoted as justiciable; they are ‘comprehensible because they involve
discrete clashes of identifiable individual interests’.  Indeed, it is believed9
that the polycentric nature of socio-economic rights, amongst others,
explains the interpretative approach of the Constitutional Court towards
these rights.10
The purpose of this paper is to highlight the problem of polycentricity
in socio-economic rights litigation and to show how the courts could
respond to it. It is easy for one to discard the objections to the consti-
tutional protection of socio-economic rights outlined during certification
of the Constitution.  However, finding remedies for the violation of these11
rights when confronted with the problem of polycentricity cannot be
done with similar ease. The courts, therefore, should not be oblivious to
the problem of polycentricity when enforcing socio-economic rights.
Rather, the courts should appreciate the polycentric nature of these
rights and devise appropriate responses thereto. The paper begins by
understanding polycentricity as defined by Fuller.  This is followed by an12
examination of the polycentric nature of socio-economic rights and its
impact on their enforcement. While Fuller’s objection to the adjudication
of socio-economic rights will be critiqued at this stage, the paper
nevertheless takes into account a number of Fuller’s proposals on how
adjudicators might overcome the problem of polycentricity. 
Fuller’s definition of polycentricity 
The problem of polycentricity in adjudication is deduced from the
writings of Fuller,  in which he set out to answer two broad13
questions. The first question is ‘what kinds of social tasks can properly
be assigned to courts and other adjudicative agencies?’  Here,14
Fuller’s objective is to define the dividing line between social tasks
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and those tasks that require an exercise of executive power. With this
objective in mind, Fuller examines the underlying assumption that
certain problems are inherently unsuited for adjudicative disposition
and should be left to the legislature. The second question Fuller sets
out to answer relates to the different forms of adjudication and
deviation from those forms. Specifically, he considers the benefits and
dangers of deviating from the ordinary forms of adjudication; are
there permissible variations beyond which one would speak of abuse
or perversion?  However, before examining Fuller’s answers to these15
questions, let us turn first to his definition of adjudication. 
In Fuller’s opinion, adjudication means more than settling disputes or
controversies. Instead, ‘adjudication should be viewed as a form of social
ordering, as a way in which the relations of men to one another are
governed and regulated’.  According to Fuller, even in the absence of16
formalised doctrines such as res judicata or stare decisis, an adjudicative
determination will always enter in some degree into the litigant’s future
relations and into the relations of other parties who see themselves as
possible litigants before the same tribunal. Such parties will conduct
themselves in a way that avoids such litigation. This is the nature of the
social ordering influence that adjudication possesses.  Fuller submits17
that what distinguishes adjudication from other forms of decision-making
is the form of participation allowed to the parties in the decision-making
process. He views adjudication as guaranteeing the parties a right to
formal and institutional participation in the decision-making process. This
is because the parties are assured the right of audience to present proofs
and reasoned arguments.  18
While Fuller acknowledges the fact that other forms of decision-
making processes may also allow for such participation, this is not
guaranteed as a right. The decision-maker is not obliged to listen to
the parties and may ignore their arguments, whether or not they are
reasoned.  Fuller gives the example of a political speech during an19
election. There is no affirmative right that the campaigner will have
the opportunity to give a reasoned speech, and even when this right
is guaranteed, there is no formal assurance that anyone will listen to
the speech, let alone act on its reasoned arguments. In Fuller’s
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opinion, a party in the process of bargaining the terms of a contract
is in no better a position. In contrast, the adjudicator is obliged to
listen to the proofs and reasoned arguments of the parties and to take
them into account when making his/her decision. The duty to consider
the arguments of the parties places a demand of rationality on the
adjudicator, which is not expected of other decision-makers.  20
The absence of meaningful participation due to impossibility, in
Fuller’s opinion, may place some tasks beyond the limits of adjudication.
He cites polycentric tasks as an example of tasks which may make
meaningful participation impossible.  A polycentric matter is one in21
respect of which a decision would have unforeseen and wide reper-
cussions affecting a multitude of parties (not necessarily similarly suited
parties), sometimes not before the court. Yet, every subtle adjustment
would have grave unforeseen repercussions.  Fuller contends that the22
range of people affected by a decision of a court is not foreseen easily.
As a result, the participation of people with such diverse interests cannot
be organised. The adjudicator is inadequately informed and cannot
determine the repercussions of the proposed solution.  He gives the23
example of the tasks of players in a football team. Each shift of position
by one player has a different repercussion for the other players. He also
compares polycentric tasks to a spider web  a pull on one strand will
distribute tensions after a complicated pattern through the web as a
whole. Doubling the original pull will not simply double each of the
resulting tensions but will rather create a complicated pattern of
tensions. He describes this as a polycentric situation, because it is multi-
centered, with each intersection of the strands becoming a distinct
centre for distributing tensions.  Along the same lines, Currie & De Waal24
define polycentric tasks as those matters which entail the co-ordination
of mutually interacting variables and a change in one variable will
produce changes for other variables.  25
The courts, unlike administrative authorities, may not have in their
possession large amounts of information to guide their decisions.  The26
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courts, either due to the limited resources of the parties or as a result
of their own rules, may be limited to the information provided in
evidence.  Such evidence may not adequately reflect the many27
competing interests implicated by the case. One of the reasons why all
affected parties cannot be made party to the litigation is because of
logistics. This includes not only the logistics available to the parties, but
also the resources placed at the disposal of the court for that purpose.28
Consequently, many complex policy issues remain unaddressed by the
court, with unexpected repercussions which could make the decision
unworkable. In Fuller’s opinion, the unworkable decision is either
ignored, withdrawn or modified, sometimes repeatedly, making it hard
to enforce and observe.29
In Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign  the Constitu-30
tional Court indicated that it was alive to the problem of the polycentric
interests embedded in socio-economic rights litigation. It held that courts
are ill-suited to adjudicate upon issues where court orders could have
multiple social and economic consequences for the community.  This31
consciousness could be used to explain the Court’s reluctance to define
a minimum core for the right of access to adequate housing; a definition
of a minimum core would have involved the Court in ‘a utilitarian calcu-
lus of social and economic advantage of a decision in a context of a
myriad of competing claims which are not before the Court’.  In Govern-32
ment v Grootboom,  the Court said that determination of a minimum33
core in the context of ‘the right to have access to adequate housing’
presents difficult questions because the needs are diverse: there are
those who need land; others need both land and houses; yet others need
financial assistance’.  According to the Court, it is not possible to34
determine the minimum threshold without first identifying the needs and
opportunities for the enjoyment of such a right. The Court said that
these will vary according to such factors as income, unemployment,
availability of land and poverty. The differences between city and rural
36 (2008) 23 SAPR/PL
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communities will also determine the needs and opportunities for the
enjoyment of this right. Variations ultimately depend on the economic
and social history and circumstances of a country. The Court said that,
unlike the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights,  it did not have access to the information that would enable it to35
define the minimum core.36
Polycentricity in socio-economic rights
Socio-economic rights cases are believed to be polycentric in nature,
firstly, because of the conception that they have budgetary conse-
quences.  It is submitted that each decision to allocate a particular37
sum of money for a specified purpose implies less money for other
purposes.  According to Davis, a case involving a person’s right to a38
house would not only impact on that person and the state, but also on
interests of other citizens. The interests of other citizens would raise
questions such as whether the money should be used to build a
crèche, a hospital or a sports stadium.39
It has also been submitted that socio-economic rights are logically
linked to collective rather than individual claims, yet courts are ill-suited
to adjudicate collective claims because they give rise to a multiplicity of
interests.  For instance, consider a case in which a court orders that the40
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government provides medical treatment to the applicants because they
cannot afford it. This case would have an impact on many other patients
not before the court, but who could also qualify for the treatment on the
same basis as the litigant. However, the medical needs of patients are
different. Some may not afford the primary care necessary for their
needs while others, though economically well placed, may not afford
tertiary medical care such as kidney or heart transplants.  41
In relation to the Soobramoney case,  it has been submitted that it42
would have been senseless to extend expensive treatment to Mr
Soobramoney ‘at a time when many poor people … had little or no access
to any form of even primary health care services’.  In this case a patient43
suffering from chronic renal failure without any chances of recovery had
laid claim to dialysis treatment at a public hospital on the basis of his
section 11 Constitutional right to life. This was in addition to his right not
to be denied emergency medical treatment.  The Constitutional Court44
upheld the state’s submission that the medical resources were con-
strained and that the hospital was justified to exclude patients from
dialysis treatment if they had no chance of recovery in order to use the
resources for those who would recover. According to the Court, ‘if
treatment has to be provided to the appellant it would also have to be
provided to all other persons similarly placed’; yet ‘the cost of doing so
would make substantial inroads into the health budget’. The Court also
outlined the repercussions of a decision that the applicant must receive
the treatment: it would involve additional expense to pay the clinic
personnel at overtime rates or to employ additional personnel working on
a shift basis; and it would also put a great strain on the existing dialysis
machines which are already showing signs of wear. Yet it was estimated
that the cost to the State of treating one chronically ill patient by means
of renal dialysis provided twice a week at a state hospital is approxi-
mately R60 000 per annum.45
Fuller contends that although other forms of adjudication may be
polycentric, what the adjudicator needs to know is when the
polycentric elements have become so significant and predominant
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that the proper limits of adjudication have been reached. He submits
that socio-economic rights take the courts to such limits, at which
point they are required to abstain from adjudicating these rights.46
However, while there is no doubt that socio-economic rights are
polycentric, one could still argue that the problem of polycentricism is
alive in all forms of constitutional litigation. Fuller concedes that all
disputes that come before the courts have either explicit or concealed
polycentric effects.  Yet this does not render litigation illegitimate;47 48
indeed, it could be argued that civil and political rights, like socio-econo-
mic rights, are polycentric in nature.  It is true that a petitioner in a49
constitutional case, whether involving civil and political rights or socio-
economic rights, may be motivated by personal or private interests. In
spite of this, the decision of the court usually has a wide impact and may
affect many people.  50
Examples of disputes based on civil and political rights will offer more
clarity. Consider a case in which the issue is the extent to which an
attorney’s right to privacy may be limited. The case will have
repercussions not only for the particular attorney and his clients, but for
hundreds, or even thousands, of other attorneys and their clients. This
is because the case may establish a precedent that binds future disputes.
Another example is a case involving the freedom of association or trade
union rights; such a case may have multiple repercussions for parties
other than the litigating union and specific employer. The decision will
have implications for all members of the particular union, members of
other unions and employers in the same or similar industries. The same
could be said of an order in a criminal trial, which may also force the
National Prosecuting Authority to employ and pay more investigators
thereby leading to budgetary adjustments. This may have multiple
repercussions. However, simply because the multitudes of affected
persons are not in court will not stop adjudication of the dispute. The
mere fact that a court cannot deal with many or all of the aspects of a
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case does not mean that it deals with none.  Epstein uses the analogy of51
an auditor  simply because an auditor cannot correct every abuse in a
department’s procurement policies does not mean that he should not go
after a $5000 coffee pot.  In the case of August v Electoral Com-52
mission,  the Constitutional Court observed that ‘[w]e cannot deny53
strong actual claims timeously asserted by determinate people because
of the possible existence of hypothetical claims that might conceivably
have been brought by indeterminate groups.’54
It is also important to note that policy formulation and legislative
processes are not immune from polycentric repercussions.  In the55
first place, one cannot assert, too strongly, that the legislative or
executive processes are representative of all the interests particularly
on issues of policy formulation and implementation.  Those who are56
not politically organised, and in most cases the impoverished, may
find it hard to make their voices heard in the political processes. In
addition, legislation and policy are usually designed and adopted in
the abstract, and implemented without first having been tested on
practical problems. The courts, in contrast, stand in an advantageous
position. While their decisions may have polycentric repercussions,
they deal with real problems never anticipated by policy makers and
legislators.  Such cases before the courts should alert the authorities57
to the widespread nature of socio-economic problems which may
either have been ignored or not contemplated.58
The Grootboom case is a good example of a judgment that alerted the
authorities to the widespread nature of the problem of lack of access to
adequate housing by many desperate people. The Constitutional Court
indicated that it was aware of the intolerable conditions under which
40 (2008) 23 SAPR/PL
Para 2.59
See President v Modderklip Boerdery 2005 8 BCLR 786 (CC); Port Elizabeth60
Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) ; City of Cape Town v Neville
Rudolph 2003 11 CLR 1236 (C); Jaftha v Schoeman [2003] 3 All SA 690 (C); and City
of Johannesburg v Rand Properties 2006 6 CLR 728 (W).
National Department of Housing, Part 3: National Housing Programme: Housing61
Assistance in Emergency Circumstances April 2004; sourced at http://www.housing.
ov.za/Content/legislation policies/ Emergency%20%20Housing%20Policy.pdf (accessed
2005-11-29). The policy acknowledges the fact that it was adopted as a direct response
to the Constitutional Court’s ruling that the existing programme was unreasonable (5). See
also the Centre for Study of Social Policy’s report, New roles for old adversaries: The
challenge of using litigation to achieve system reform (January 1998) available at
htt://www.cssp.org/uploadFiles/New for-old adversaries .pdf> (accessed 2005-11-30).
This report notes that a judicial decree can spotlight the worst abuses and galvanise public
attention thereby producing short-term gains in funding for more services. The report
contends further that class action litigation can serve to spark and sustain real institutional
change in deeply troubled jurisdictions. It can force agencies to acknowledge the
magnitude of the problem and pay attention to resolving it (3). 
Shelton Remedies in international human rights law (1999) 38. See also Roach62
Constitutional remedies in Canada (1994) 3-2; Weinrib ‘Corrective justice in a
nutshell’ (2002) 52 Univ of Toronto LJ sourced at http://www.utpjournals.com
/product/utlj/524/524 weinrib.html (accessed 2006-06-22). See also Modak-Truran
‘Corrective justice and the revival of judicial virtue’ (2000) 12 Yale Journal of Law
and Humanities 252; and Keating ‘Distributive and corrective justice in tort law of
accidents’ 2000 Southern California LR 193.
many people are still living and that the respondents were but a fraction
of them.  The declaration of the Court that the government’s housing59
programme was unreasonable has since inspired litigation and policy
revision in the area of housing rights.  The Court’s ruling that govern-60
ment’s housing policy was unreasonable for failure to provide for the
needs of those in desperate need prompted government to adopt an
emergency housing policy.  When such policies are adopted, they will61
have wide application and benefit all people in situations similar to that
of the litigant(s). 
Confronting polycentricity 
Fuller’s approach is backed by forms of litigation based on the notion of
corrective justice. Unlike distributive justice, the notion of corrective
justice focuses on the individual litigant before the court and is aimed at
restoring such litigant to the position he/she would have been in had the
violation not occurred.  Courts making decisions based on this theory62
ignore the impact of their remedies on interests other than those of the
litigating parties. In addition to ignoring the interests of similarly situated
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people they fail to appreciate and engage with the multiple repercussions
of their decisions. Such courts are therefore not interested in engaging
the problem of polycentricity.
In contrast, the notion of distributive justice is aimed at redressing
legal wrongs not only for the benefit of the litigating parties, but also for
similarly situated persons.  A court basing its decision on the theory of63
distributive justice may decline to put a litigant in a position he/she
would have been in had the violation not occurred if this would affect
other legitimate interests. Polycentricity comes alive here because the
court must try to understand the wide range of interests involved in the
case and appreciate the polycentric repercussions of any decision it
makes.  In this regard, when faced with a socio-economic rights case,64
the court’s focus will go beyond the interests of the individual litigant(s).
With this approach, while there may be a risk of opening the floodgates,65
the court’s objective is to maximise the benefit of the remedy which
conversely helps to close the floodgates. This is in addition to awarding
remedies whose implementation would not be hampered by polycentric
interests. Indeed, there is always a danger that if all concerned or those
with similar interests are not invited to participate in that remedial
process they may reject and block the implementation of the remedy:66
When those excluded complain, often justifiably, that their position
has not received a fair hearing, political as well as bureaucratic
obstacles to implementation are often created. Thus, in order to
minimize opposition to implementation, it is advisable to invite the
participation at the decree formulation stage of relevant non-parties.67
It is also true that unless the state is convinced that the implementation
of the remedy would not disrupt its programmes towards similarly situated
persons it may shun the remedy by refusing to implement it. 
While polycentricity does not disqualify socio-economic rights from
judicial protection, it presents a problem that needs to be tackled. To
resolve polycentric tasks, Fuller proposes a new form of adjudication
which he refers to as ‘mixed form adjudication’.  By ‘mixed form68
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adjudication’ Fuller means ‘a mixture of adjudication and negotiation’.69
To drive his point home, Fuller uses the example of a labour dispute
arising from an agreement to make salary adjustments with multiple
variables which would not only benefit but affect all employees and the
employer. To resolve this dispute, Fuller proposes the use of a ‘tripartite’
arbitration board. Such an arbitration board would be constituted by an
impartial chairman who is flanked by two fellow arbitrators. One of the
two arbitrators would be selected by the employer and the other by the
labour union. The arbitration board would reach its decision unanimously
after mutual consultation not only amongst its members but also with the
parties. The two arbitrators appointed by the union and the employer
respectively will be alive to the interests of the party they present and
will bring their experience to bear upon the decision. However, to
counter the problem of extending the failed negotiations into the
arbitration process, the objectivity and neutrality of the chairman will
become useful. The impact of this process is that it will result in a
decision which has taken into account all the interests and is likely to be
accepted by all the parties. 
In my opinion, this form of mixed adjudication will enable the
arbitration body to be informed of interests that would have not been
brought to light had the process not had a tripartite character. This will
educate the tribunal on all the repercussions that the decision is likely to
have on the parties and all directly implicated interests. In addition, it
will produce a result that is acceptable to all the parties because of the
degree of participation in the remedy selection process. Participation will
bring to light the obstacles likely to be encountered and, without
surprise, clarify the remedial obligations of the parties in a cooperative
manner. This makes implementation of the decision easy and forestalls
resistance when the time comes to assume the remedial obligations. 
Mixed adjudication should be contrasted with adversarial litigation.
Adversarial litigation processes may not provide the opportunity for
consideration of all interests implicated by a case.  Yet, ‘lawyers’70
control over the process in adversarial litigation tends to detract from
the client’s sense of autonomy and responsibility’.  As a result, the71
ruling emanating from such ‘winner-takes-all’ litigation will not take into
consideration interests and arguments not presented before the court.72
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This is because the ‘win-lose’ character of the adversary process prevents
the exchange and integration of multiple perspectives necessary to
produce an effective remedy.73
To avoid grappling with the problem of unforeseen repercussions when
implementing remedies in socio-economic rights litigation, therefore, one
would advocate for non-adversarial litigation. However, this is not to
suggest that adversarial litigation should not play any role in the
adjudication process. Fuller goes to great lengths to demonstrate the
advantages of adversarial litigation. In Fuller’s opinion, ‘an adversary
presentation seems the only means for combating ‘[the] human tendency
to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar, that which is not yet fully
known’.  Fuller is of the view that judicial decision-makers are suscep-74
tible to making quick conclusions about situations and then later applying
these conclusions consistently to seemingly similar situations:
What generally occurs in practice is that at some early point a familiar
pattern will seem to emerge from the evidence; an accustomed label is
wanting for the case and, without awaiting further proofs, this label is
promptly assigned to it. It is a mistake to suppose that this premature
cataloguing must necessarily result from impatience, prejudice or mental
sloth. Often it proceeds from a very understandable desire to bring the
hearing into some order and coherence … But what starts as a preliminary
diagnosis makes a strong imprint on the mind, while all that runs counter
to it is received with diverted attention.75
Fuller contends that the arguments of counsel, and the preparations
they make, render it possible to explore all the peculiarities and nuances
of the case. Additionally, the preparation process leads to a preliminary
analysis of issues which gives the hearing form and direction.  He adds76
that the exchange of written pleadings between the parties will greatly
reduce the dispute. In addition, the process gives adjudication integrity
by allowing the parties, through their representatives, to present facts
and issues through legal proofs and arguments. Fuller contends further
that the adjudicator also gains confidence in reaching his decision on the
basis of arguments and proofs provided by the parties.  77
Similarly, Shaibani submits that some forms of litigation, including
constitutional law cases, ‘are likely to stir emotional and idiosyncratic
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reactions in the participants’.  However, through adversarial litigation78
the parties will be able to resolve their disputes in an environment where
emotions can be controlled, which reduces the chances of undesirable
confrontation. The parties will therefore be able to express their
aggression without physical fights.79
In spite of its advantages, however, adversarial litigation also has its
disadvantages. Adversarial litigation is time consuming, expensive, and
it emphasises the differences between the parties in a way that maxi-
mises the sense of conflict.  Adversarial litigation is also individualistic,80
in the sense that evidence is gathered to support the respective parties’
arguments and interests.  When the court adopts an adversarial style of81
litigation it has to rely on the parties providing all the relevant infor-
mation. This means that there may be many unanswered or unexplored
issues and questions because the parties will be selective in the infor-
mation they present. In contrast, a more inquisitorial approach might
allow the court to satisfy itself that it has all the relevant information
needed to reach a decision.  This would allow the court to adequately82
consider all the reasonably foreseeable interests affected by the case and
which the court is reasonably able to address. 
It is my submission that a non-adversarial style of litigation would,
while maintaining the advantages of adversarial litigation, minimise
its disadvantages. Such a non-adversarial style would be akin to what
Fuller has described above as ‘mixed adjudication’ combining both
adjudication and negotiation. In addition to Fuller’s mixed form
adjudication other forms of non-adversarial litigation could be used
in order to allow for attention to issues and interests that would
otherwise not be addressed in adversarial litigation. This form of
adjudication would be aimed at ensuring maximum participation of all
the parties, and sometimes affected non-parties, in the decision-
making process and in the design and implementation of the remedy.
This is in addition to fostering dialogue between the courts and the
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other branches of state. This will promote inter-institutional relations
that will facilitate the realisation of the rights by leading to effective
and well received remedies.  83
Indeed, it is also at the level of remedies where the greatest potential
lies for forging inter-institutional relations, which will help bring about
relief that is both effective and legitimate in the eyes both of the
litigants and of society at large.  The court, while declaring that there84
is a violation and directing its remediation could still leave some matters
open for discussion between the parties. The court could also order that
persons not party to the suit but with interests that may be impacted on
by the case be consulted. A good example of a case where this approach
may be relevant is when, for instance, the remedy has implications for
other spheres of government not originally party to the suit. It is always
very hard for one sphere of government to discharge its socio-economic
rights obligations without the co-operation of other spheres. This is
because of the sometimes overlapping competences of government and
the enforced spirit of co-operation and interdependence.
Indeed, the use of non-adversarial forms of litigation including
mediation in socio-economic rights litigation is increasingly gaining
support,  especially within the context of promoting institutional85
dialogue.  In the case of Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various86
Occupiers,  Sachs J, for instance, emphasised the benefits that87
mediation would bring in constitutional litigation. He said that:
Not only can mediation reduce the expenses of litigation, it can help
avoid the exacerbation of tensions that forensic combat produces. By
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bringing the parties together, narrowing the areas of dispute between
them and facilitating mutual give-and-take, mediators can find ways
around sticking-points in a manner that the adversarial process might
not be able to do. Money that otherwise might be spent on unpleasant
and polarising litigation can better be used to facilitate an outcome
that ends a stand-off, promotes respect for human dignity and
underlines the fact that we live in a shared society.88
It should also be noted that non-adversarial forms of litigation not only
make it possible to tackle polycentric tasks, they reduce the tensions
between the court and other organs. The court will not be perceived by
the other organs as imposing obligations on them, instead it will be seen
as facilitating dialogue between the parties. It should be noted, however,
that the successful use of this form of litigation is very much dependent
on whether the parties are willing to participate in it in good faith. Its
success is therefore not entirely dependent on the court, but also on the
attitude of the parties. Dialogue, cooperation and collaboration are
voluntary and cannot be imposed upon a person with a negative attitude.
Widened ‘locus standi’ to accommodate polycentric interests
As demonstrated above, Fuller’s theory of polycentricism was conceived
with reference to private law litigation and is based on the notion of
corrective justice. Fuller’s theory does not take into account the
complexities of modern public law litigation. This form of litigation has
become very complex and often involves a number of interests meriting
legal protection. Under a legal duty to protect human rights, modern
courts have resorted to distributive justice methods of litigation that
deviate substantially from the traditional forms. The social realities are
that our social existence is now defined by large-scale organisations,
particularly government bureaucracies and that to insist on adjudicative
methods that ignore these realities is a mistake.  As seen above, Fuller’s89
main concern with socio-economic rights litigation is that it does not
guarantee participation by all the interests concerned. However, Fuller
fails to explore ways to bring on board the participation, as much as is
reasonably possible, of all those affected by a case.90
In constitutional litigation, a court may confront polycentric
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challenges by involving a wide range of parties in the resolution of the
dispute.  In fact, at the disposal of the courts are several procedures91
that allow judges to invite participation by all persons affected by a
case. A judge could order the issuance of third party notices to people
he/she thinks may be affected by a decision. In addition to this, the
judge may appoint a guardian ad litem to represent absentee
interests.  In modern constitutional states, constitutional litigation92
is often complemented by provisions widening locus standi, which
opens up the process of litigation to a greater number of interested
parties. This is the spirit of section 38 of the Constitution,  which93
widens the locus beyond the confines of the common law.  The94
Constitutional Court has embraced the spirit of this section fully by
allowing access to the courts to a variety of people who in traditional
terms would not have had audience. The Rules of the Court allow any
person who is entitled to join the proceedings to apply for leave to
intervene at any stage of the proceedings.  The Rules also allow for95
the participation as amici curiae: ‘any person interested in any matter
before the Court’.  This rule has been used mainly by public interest96
groups, human rights advocates and academic research institutions to
promote the interests of marginalised groups and to suggest inter-
pretations of the human rights provisions in the Constitution.
Examples of such groups in socio-economic rights litigation include the
Legal Resource Centre, Treatment Action Campaign, the Community
Law Centre at the University of the Western Cape and the Center for
Applied Legal Studies at the University of Witwatersrand.  97
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Chaskalson J, in Ferreira v Levin NO,  held that the Court should98
rather adopt a broader approach to standing.  This would be consistent99
with the mandate given to the Court to uphold the Constitution and
would serve to ensure that constitutional rights enjoy the full measure
of protection to which they are entitled. In Ngxuza v Department of
Welfare, Eastern Cape,  the applicants’ disability grants had been100
suspended without due process of law. They brought an action on their
own behalf and on behalf of others in a similar position that numbered
over 100,000. Relying on section 38, the Court rejected the objection
that the applicants did not have standing. The Court said that the
practical difficulties associated with representative and class actions
could not justify denial of such action when the Constitution made
specific provision for it.  According to the Court, a flexible and generous101
approach was called for to make it easier for disadvantaged and poor
people to approach the courts on public issues and to ensure that the
public administration adhered to the fundamental constitutional principle
of legality in the exercise of public power.  This decision was confirmed102
by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Department of Welfare v Ngxuza.103
The involvement of a number of parties in the litigation will bring
into perspective interests which the main parties have not considered.
This will enable the court to make decisions that do not adversely
affect such other interests. This does not, however, mean that all
interests will be brought to light;  rather it plays a very important104
minimising role and may provoke inquiry into the impact of the
decision on interests not directly implicated. Though the judge must
be certain that the full range of interests is represented he/she
should not fail in his/her duty to protect a right simply because every
affected individual cannot meaningfully be represented.
Conclusion
The problem of polycentricity is more acute in socio-economic rights
litigation than in other forms of litigation. This is because, by their
nature, socio-economic rights implicate collective interests and require
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a careful distribution of resources. This is especially visible in countries
that have wide income inequality gaps such as South Africa. However,
this does not mean than civil and political rights are not polycentric. The
difference lies in degree and in the fact that socio-economic rights,
generally speaking, require far more positive action to realize and are
mainly violated by failure to provide.  In a context of widespread105
poverty the problem becomes very real as courts have to see to it that
resources, while being applied to meet the positive needs of individuals,
should not compromise other equally legitimate interests. 
It should also be noted that the notion of polycentricity strengthens
the position of those who oppose the justiciability of socio-economic
rights on the ground that these rights involve the redistribution of
resources, a task for which courts are ill-suited.  However, I have106
demonstrated here that the problem of the polycenticity of socio-
economic rights, which is also true of civil and political rights, should not
affect the justiciability of these rights. In spite of this, I have argued that
this does not mean that polycentricty does not present a problem that
courts need to attend to when they search for remedies for violations of
these rights. The courts should open the litigation to as many interested
persons as is reasonably possible by employing flexible rules of standing.
This is in addition to adopting non-adversarial styles of litigation in order
to converse all issues and appreciate, as much as is reasonably possible,
all interests implicated by the case.107
